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This study focussed on the perceptions of the Navy's
Human Resource Management Specialists (HRMSs) toward their
coworkers and the Human Resources Management (HRM) program.
Thirty HRMSs from all the HRM centers and detachments were
interviewed using an open ended interview guide. The data
were analyzed by using the methodologies of Dunham & Smith,
McCall & Simmons, Schatzman & Strauss, and Webb's "Triangula-
tion" technique.
The data indicated perceptions of an improved image in the
fleet. Concern was varied about top level support, marketing
for the HRM program, the possibility of a future voluntary
HRM cycle, and the emphasis currently being placed on certain
HRM programs. The HRMS was perceived as improving in quality,
yet some thought more stringent entry criteria were needed.
The need for warfare specialists and HRMSs with previous
experience was also expressed. Recommendations are offered
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This study is concerned with determining the perceptions
of Human Resource Management specialists toward their jobs
and coworkers. Specifically, are Human Resource Management
specialists ' image of the current HRM program the same as
their image of what the HRM program should be?
An interview guide was developed for this purpose and
administered to Human Resource Management specialists in
various Human Resource Management Centers (HRMCs) and Detach-
ments (HRMDs) . The questions were open ended and based on
similar questions in a previous study of fleet Naval Officers
'
image of the HRM program [Mixner, 1978 J . Other questions were
based on the author's experience tour of duty at an HRMD.
The author's personal experience in the HRM program at
the Naval Postgraduate School provided the initiative for
this paper. It was here that the author became aware of an
attitude of resistance toward the HRM program among fellow
officers. While on the practical experience tour, the author
also observed resistance to one aspect of the HRM program,
survey guided development.
B. PURPOSE
It is the purpose of this thesis to identify areas of
concern in the HRM program as perceived by the Human Resource

Management Specialists (HRMSs) . If we assume that the HRMSs
have the experience and the knowledge necessary for recom-
mending intelligent policy guidance for the HRM program, then
specific directions for improvement of the image of the Navy's
HRM program could be ascertained. The author has done this
in the last chapter of this study by qualitatively measuring
the difference between the HRMS ' s present or "as is" attitude
toward the HRM program and the future or "should be" attitude
toward the HRM program.
C . BACKGROUND
The last two decades have witnessed social and technolog-
ical changes which far overshadow both the amount and rate
of changes at any other time in history. One result of these
social forces has been an increased awareness of the worth
of the individual. The Navy, as an extension of the larger
society, has been similarly affected by the dynamics of
changing attitudes in society.
Forces for change in the Navy have come from external
and internal sources. Declining resources and increased
demands for efficiency under the "all volunteer" concept can
be seen as external requirements. At the same time, the
Department of Defense's Human Goals Credo of 1969 began
several internally generated programs to counter racial in-
cidents and other social disturbances during the early 197 O's.

Change became a necessity. However, the Navy, like other
large organizations, feared disruptive changes which might
threaten its mission. The application of behavioral science
in organizational settings was seen as a way to assist Navy
commands with orderly change. The chosen means of bringing
about that change was "organizational development" (OD) ." The
Navy's first OD effort was initiated in 1971 under Admiral
Zumwalt with the establishment of the Human Relations Project
Office. Presently, organizational development in the Navy
is called the Human Resource Management (HRM) program. HRM
now incorporates the once separate programs of command
development, equal opportunity, drug and alcohol education,
and overseas diplomacy. Individual counseling and assistance
problems in drug and alcohol abuse are also handled by
various centers, which together with the HRM effort, make up
what is known as the Human Resource Management Support System.
The Human Resource Management component of that system can
be viewed in Appendix B.
By instruction, fleet units are to receive HRM activities
every 18 to 24 months, normally via a survey guided develop-
ment effort (SGD) . This effort culminates in a week long
problem solving and action planning session known as the
Human Resource Availability week (HRAV) . Out of this planning
activity comes the Command Action Plan (CAP) and Affirmative
Action Plan (AAP) for approaching command and equal oppor-
tunity problems respectively. Many HRM centers and

detachments are not operating strictly by this instruction
however. Instead they are offering voluntary services to
fleet units in many different areas. There is a possibility
that all HRM centers and detachments will be operating as a
voluntary service in the future.
The metamorphosis of the HRM program has not been a
smooth transition. The program's image has suffered from
the belief of some that the program is solely involved with
the early equal opportunity oriented "upwards" seminars.
These seminars were given in response to a crisis of racial
incidents aboard Navy vessels in the early 197 O's. They left
a bad impression on many due to their perceived unmilitary
approach.
Presently, resistance by fleet personnel to the HRM
program is offset by mandated requirements for participation
in HRM activities. Considering the possibility of a voluntary
HRM cycle, it becomes paramount that the resistance to the




The literature in the social sciences concerning data
gathering is replete with researchers arguing for the advan-
tages of one form over another. Out of this debate has grown
a research method that supports the use of multiple methods.
This research tactic has been described as convergent valida-
tion or, what Webb [et al., 1966] has called "triangulation.
"
The term triangulation has its roots in navigation
strategy. Just as the navigator can get a more accurate
idea of his whereabouts using two or more lines of position,
the researcher can improve the accuracy of his/her judgments
by collecting different kinds of data bearing on the same
phenomenon [Jick, 1979]
.
The basic assumption of triangulation lies in the hope
that a weakness, or potential for bias, in one method will
be offset by a strength of another [ Jick, 1979] . Any vari-
ance found between results of a trait by two or more indepen-
dent methods would be a variance of the trait and not the
method. This convergence between two or more methods is
labeled by Denzin (1978) as the "between (or across) methods"
type, and represents the most popular use of triangulation
[Jick, 1979].
This "between-method" triangulation tests the degree of
external validity and is designed for convergent validation





Three separate methods of data gathering were used in
the study; field observations as a participant observer at
an HRMD, intensive interviewing with an interview guide, and
document analysis (when it offered a specific insight to a
perceived issue)
.
The materials for the field observation portion of this
study were collected over a one month period while the author
was attached to an HRMD as part of his graduate school train-
ing. Perceptions of events were initially jotted down as
they occurred. In the evenings, jotted notes were smoothed
into field journal entries. In addition, the recollection
and smoothing of notes was greatly facilitated by another
student who accompanied the author on the field experience.
As an observer at the HRMD the author was both a complete
participant and participant-as-observer . McCall and Simmons
(1969) define the complete participant as one whose true
identity and purpose in field research are not known to
those whom he observes. Although the identity was known,
thus alleviating the problem of role-pretense, the purpose
of the author's visit was not known as one of researcher.
Indeed, it was the field experience that first sparked the
author's interest in the subject of this paper.
For the most part, however, the author's role more
closely resembled that of participant-as-observer. McCall
Simmons (1969) state that in this role, both field worker
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and informant are aware that theirs is a field relationship.
As such, the greatest problem faced by the author was one of
"going native." McCall and Simmons (1969) state that this
happens when the field worker over-identifies with the in-
formant and starts to lose his research perspective. This
was compounded by the fact that this researcher would most
likely someday find himself employed in a job very similar
to that of the informant ' s
.
An open ended interview was formulated (see Appendix A)
for the gathering of further qualitative data* Using Mixner '
s
(1978) study and field observations as a framework, questions
were written for the purpose of eliciting the HRM specialists
'
perceptions concerning the "as is" and "should be" state of
the Navy's HRM program and HRM specialist.
Since the author had little knowledge of what the re-
sponses might reveal, an unstructured interview format was
used. Lofland (1976) describes this kind of format as in-
tensive interviewing with an interview guide. Lofland (1976)
goes on to state:
Its object is to find out what kinds of things are
happening, rather than to determine the frequency of
pre-determined kinds of things that the researcher
already believes can happen.
Given the relative autonomy of the Navy's HRM centers
and detachments [Bishop & Gaskin, 1979] , it was decided that
some personnel from all the HRM centers and detachments be
interviewed. The structure of the Navy's HRM system and
their geographic location can be viewed in Appendix B.
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Due to the wide geographical area involved, telephone
interviews were decided upon. The military's world-wide
AUTOVON telephone network was utilized. Calls were placed
during low usage times for the majority of AUTOVON users
(located in the continental U.S.) whenever feasible. There-
fore, the success of "holding a line" and clarity of
reception were greatly enhanced.
Due to the author's knowledge of the formal categories
of team leader and team member among the ranks of the HRM
specialists, a sampling procedure for interviewees of the
sort described by McCall and Simmons (1969) as quota sam-
pling was utilized.
This quota sampling involved essentially two facets.
First, senior officers in the positions of Commanding Officer,
Executive Officer, or Operations Officer, in the case of
HRM centers, and Of ficer-in-Charge, Assistant Officer-in-
Charge, or Operations Officer, in the case of HRM detach-
ments, were interviewed. It was felt that their positions
gave them a vantage point for an overall perspective of
their programs. In addition, if not already team leaders,
they would have close working relationships with their team
leaders and may voice their team leaders' joint concerns.
The second facet involved interviewing an enlisted mem-
ber at each of the centers and detachments for his/her
individual perspective. These individuals were not strati-
fied by rank since, in the vast majority of cases, they
13

were all in the chief petty officer category structure. This
subgroup was comprised of both team members and team leaders.
Randomness of sampling was increased in that an enlisted
team member/leader was requested on initial call up. In
only two of the cases, the individuals broke off the inter-
view after learning of its purpose. Therefore, the randomness
of the quota sample was assumed.
In three of the HRM center and detachment locations
another officer was interviewed. In addition, an enlisted
team member from HRMC Washington was not interviewed since
there were none available.
Out of a total of approximately 380 possible respondents
30 interviews were collected. This number is within the
number typically found in other qualitative interviewing
studies. According to Lofland (1971) , other studies of this
type normally use between 20 to 50 interviews. This seemingly
small number is due to the enormous amount of material that
is generated. Breadth is sacrificed for depth.
Document analysis consisted of both official and un-
official reports and articles which shed light on certain
issues developed in the analysis of the field journal and
interview data. Although the views contained in such lit-
erary works is often partisan or merely official views, those
imparted by informants may be no less partisan or official






In approaching the problems involved in analyzing inter-
view data, a three step problem solving design presented by
Butler (1979) was used. These steps address obstacles to
overcome in planning the analysis of qualitative data. They
are 1.) mass of data, 2.) categories, and 3.) bias.
First, the problems faced by the analysis of a large
mass of data was handled in the following manner. The tele-
phone interviews were conducted over a one month period and
averaged twenty minutes each. During the interviews, rough
notes were made on copies of the interview form (Appendix A)
.
The interviews were tape recorded with the permission of
the respondents in all cases. Later, the rough notes were
smoothed to direct quotes via the recordings.
After the interviewing was completed, the smoothed notes
were transposed to long sheets of legal pad by question
response. Coded by number for cross reference with the
smooth notes, this allowed for initial analysis by question.
The next step involved the generation of rough categories
and the concurrent classification of general leaning of
response (i.e., bad, good, improving, etc.). The first
generation of categories allowed the combination of responses
due to the similarity of certain responses and their justifi-
cations. Responses from questions two and three and ques-
tions seven and eight were combined in this manner.
15

The responses were coded by HRM center or detachment so
that any bias by locality might be easily discerned. Finally,
the question response sheets were coded such that they could
be laid side by side for a horizontal look at an individual's
set of responses for trends toward individual types as
positive, negative, etc.
In analyzing the verbal data attention was directed at
learning about the respondents ' operational and modal reali-
ties. As expressed by Schatz and Strauss (1973)
:
Specifically, what the listener is after are the
expressed "is's" and "because* s" of his subjects.
The "is" reveals their designations of the things,
people and events—the objectified content of these
people's reality. The "because" reveals the presumed
relations among all the designations, the why's and
wherefore's, the causes, processes, and reason— in
short, the very logic of their thinking about the
content of their reality.
The second problem to overcome was the categorization of
data. The first phase of analysis, that of content analysis,
involved the categorization of responses. As related by
Dunham and Smith (1979) , this involves placing comments in
categories that grow out of the analysis. This is a form of
differential analysis.
The second phase of the analysis, that of integrative
analysis, was conducted for underlying themes of individuals'
perceptions [Dunham & Smith, 1979] . This was accomplished




The third, and final step as presented by Butler (1979)
was bias. The author suspected three possible forms of bias.
The first was concerned with the interview guide itself. The
bias of the research instrument was reduced by the standardiza-
tion of presentation which allowed for content comparability.
The second bias dealt with the author's personal biases.
The bias of the researcher was probably most seriously ac-
centuated by "going native" as a participant observer. While
analyzing data, the most objective stance was attempted by
the author. The third bias considered was that of the
respondents. The bias of the respondents in the form of
ulterior motives, or vested interests, could not be deter-
mined directly, and was proposed under specific responses
when its presence was suspected.
When analyzing the field notes, retrospective reworking
proved to be the major source of data. Retrospective re-
working is a process by which the researcher recalls certain
peripheral events while studying his field notes. In this
manner, significant aspects of the event may appear that
were previously omitted [McCall & Simmons, 1969].
The goal of the qualitative analysis was probably best
expressed by Lofland (1971)
:
The qualitative analyst seeks to provide an
explicit rendering of the structure, order, and




This chapter is organized by interview question results
with subsequent discussion of field observations and document
analysis where applicable. Occasionally, interviewees 1
responses under one question were transferred to a more ap-
plicable question when the author thought it was warranted.
Question one: What is your experience with the Navy's HRM
program?
The only analysis considered for this question was one
of determining time as an HRM specialist and if the indi-
vidual was ever a user of HRM services prior to becoming a
HRM specialist. On average, the respondents had spent 28.6
months in the program and approximately 50% had been prior
users of HRM services.
Question two & three: How do you feel HRM is perceived in
the fleet?* Why do you think these
perceptions are so?
These questions were analyzed jointly as their responses
considerably overlapped.
In the vast majority of cases, the responses pointed to
mixed perceptions of the HRM program which were improving.
The subgroups in which the mixed perceptions were most
frequently reported to occur were by: 1.) Commanding
Officer/Executive Officer, 2.) Command levels, 3.) Community
(surface, subsurface, and aviation), and 4.) HRM programs.
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Those who mentioned the Commanding Officer/Executive
Officer level of perceptions stated that the most important
factor in perceptions was past experience v/ith the program
and they pointed to the importance of commitment from the
top of the organization in an organizational development
venture.
Respondents who viewed perceptions of their program via
command levels tended to state that: 1.) the staff level
were unknowledgeable about the HRM program, 2.) the upper
command level (CO/XO) were the most knowledgeable, 3.) the
middle management level were the most resistant, and 4.) the
lower levels were the most unknowledgeable.
Interviewees who saw the division of opinions about the
HRM program occurring by community tended to cite the over-
committed surface Navy with its lack of time for HRM activi-
ties. They portrayed the subsurface community with its high
priority for manning as possibly having less interest in
conserving its human resources. The aviation community was
perceived as having a basic maintenance approach to HRM,
utilizing the Human Resource Availability Week for upgrading
of its Command Action Plan.
Those who thought the perceptions varied by HRM program
tended to report that equal opportunity, phase II, and women
in the Navy workshops were at times received as phony or
plastic. Drug and alcohol abuse workshops were felt to be
received with mixed responses. Leadership and management
19

skills workshops and survey guided development were reported
to be received positively in the fleet if they resulted in
a good Command Action Plan or Affirmative Action Plan.
Some reasons given for the improvement in the perception
of the HRM program were:
The Commanding Officers see a benefit in using the HRM
programs.
Commanding Officers who have had a successful HRM inter-
vention advertise their successes with other Commanding
Officers.
HRM is offering more practical products to client
commands.
The commands know its their program, dealing with their
needs.
The education of officers concerning HRM at PCO/PXO
school and the Naval Postgraduate School.
The most often cited reason for negative perceptions
of the HRM program dealt with past experiences with the
program, specifically poor perceptions concerning the equal
opportunity upwards awareness seminar and equal opportunity
phase II programs. Explanations for the poor perceptions
noted deficiencies in the instructures ' motivations and the
mandated approach of the program.
Some other reported reasons for a negative attitude
toward the HRM program included:
The burden it places on already overcommitted surface
units.
•
Little marketing being done for HRM programs. '
Lack of immediate results in HRM OD ventures.
20

Lack of top level exposure to HRM programs.
The HRM specialist was credited with improving perceptions
of the HRM program by doing a better job of analyzing survey
data and providing feedback due to their training at Memphis
and their increased specialization. However, the HRM
specialist is sometimes, although not as much as in the
past, perceived as an "escape artist," trying to get out of
his/her warfare specialty for shore duty.
Some of the comments in answer to these questions follow;
"Varies tremendously depending on client command and
previous experience that that command and those
people in that command have had with the system."
"Changing from Phase I image.... now more to client
needs. At the present time it's gaining a great
deal of credibility. I think it's now being per-
ceived as a positive force for change in the fleet."
"A very, very poor experience in race relations in
the Phase I and even some of the Phase II evolutions.
Some people had some very bad experiences with it
as I did."
"Most commands in the Navy see value in what we do
and would like to take advantage of it, but they
just can't because of meeting commitments and doing
what their main function is comes first. We realize
that too."
When the responses were analyzed by area there appeared
to be a tendency for respondents to answer in a similar
manner. This observation, given the sample size, of course
would be based on conjecture alone.
The field experience data generally supported these per-
ceptions. There was an overall feeling of mixed perceptions
21

to their programs as related by the HRM specialists. These
perceptions were driven for the most part by good or bad
past experiences. Phase I and II problems and bias were
frequently mentioned as stumbling blocks.
However, an incident involving the initial meeting and
subsequent surveying of a submarine crew failed to support
the beforementioned comment concerning submarine community
disinterest with the program. HRM specialists in charge of
the intervention stated that they felt the submarine Com-
manding Officer was interested and committed to the process.
Document analysis was found to be equally supportive of
these perceptions. Forbes (1977) mentioned an early problem
with the utilization of non-career identified consultants.
He also pointed to the resistance to the HRM program by the
middle management and supervisory ranks due to their per-
ceived disassociation with ownership in the program. More
recently, an.' analysis of the HRM program done by Bishop
and Gaskin (1979) has recommended that major marketing
efforts at all levels should be initiated to improve the
image of the program. They also stated that higher priority
events can detract from the impact the HRM program has on
a command.
Question four: Are fleet personnel aware of HRM program
successes? •
There wasn't as much of a concensus on this question as
upon the last two questions. The responses varied from no,
22

or the majority is not aware, to yes, or the majority is
aware. Surprisingly, an analysis by detachment, center,
and fleet failed to turn up any regional trends in answering
this question.
In the previous questions, respondents sometimes replied
that perceptions varied by rank and their subsequent know-
ledge level. In like manner, the interviewees sometimes
linked rank and their knowledge levels of the HRM program
with awareness of HRM program successes. The Immediate
Senior in Command (ISIC) level and staff officer level along
with very junior enlisted and junior officers were reported
to be the most unknowledgeable. Generally, however, the
higher up the chain of command to the Commanding Officer
level, the more knowledge about HRM successes.
An often cited reason for their belief that fleet person-
nel were aware of HRM program successes was the observation
that their clients were coming to them for business and
their workshops were filled.
The mixed perceptions seemed to be caused by the lack of
public relations about services Navy wide. Therefore, the
only personnel who had any knowledge about successes were
those who had experienced one.
Among the insights stated for a lack of awareness of HRM
successes were:
CO/XOs have limited knowledge of HRM concepts and
cant 1 judge its success.
HRM results aren't very quantifiable.
23

A self-fulfilling prophecy of negative perceptions
about the HRM program prevents them from obtaining
successes.
A lack of credit given to HRM for program successes
by COs because doing so would be admitting that HRM
had helped them.*
Some of the comments obtained from this question were:
"Sailors are very aware here. We don't have to knock
on doors for business. They come to us. We're
booked one month to six weeks in advance."
"It's being gradually implemented and they're be-
coming aware of it. People are starting to realize
that it's a slow process with benefits down the
road."
"Generally no, unless they've been involved in one
of their own."
"Not overall, there's very little 'PR' Navy wide
about services."
The field observations, while not extensive in this area,
did point to a perceived lack of advertising about the HRM
program.
Question five: What would a success or failure of the HRM
cycle be in your opinion? •
A success was judged quite often to be some sort of
measurable improvement, i.e., better retention, climate, or
fewer problem areas. Other measures of success included:
CO's report on the HRM activity
Meeting the needs of the command
99% command involvement
Return business for HRM services




The opinions of a failure ranged from "no such thing" to
"the cycle is a failure." In general, however, a failure
was reported as:
No commitment for change
Closed doors (not accepting HRM services) or treating
it as something that has to be done
Not meeting the needs of the command by command or
joint assessment
Poor mission effectiveness
Some of the comments evoked by this question included:
Success-
"Follow-on activities is our best measure of success."
"Measurable improvement in readiness, retention,
morale, and most importantly, however unmeasurable,
combat effectiveness."
Failure-
"A lot of experience here. CO gives lip service,
CAP in waste basket, AAP in drawer, no feedback,
sometimes we don't even get through initial meeting."
"Can't say you would have failure as long as you have
support of CO.
"
Participant observation seemed to suggest a tendency for
success to be measured by improvements in readiness, problems,
and the command's ability to take care of itself. While
some considered a failure to be closed doors, others seemed
to consider closed doors to be more of a neutral event.
Although the HRM program has had difficulty in determin-
ing a quantifiable measure of success, it has been shown to
have some impact on non-judicial punishment [Crawford and
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Thomas, 1975], operational performance [Mumford, 1976], and
reenlistment rates [Drexler and Bowers, 1978]. On a more
pessimestic note, although we crave a numerical verification
of what we are doing, it may be impossible to prove that
what OD consultants are doing is effective [Pfeiffer and
Jones, 1976].
Question six: What quality of people are being assigned to
the HRM effort? What quality were assigned
in the past?
This question tended to evoke immediate confident responses
from the most positive end of the spectrum to the most nega-
tive. While it might be said that the remarks leaned more
toward the good and improving side of the issue, it would be
purely conjecture as there were several negative and dis-
improving comments.
Factors that have led to an improvement in the quality of
HRMSs were reported as:
Emphasis in detailing
More career oriented HRMSs
More highly skilled or educated HRMSs
Less "escape artists" from the fleet
More HRMSs with experience either in command at sea
or with the HRM program previously
More well rounded HRMSs in the field of management
techniques vice just equal opportunity
Reasons noted for a decline of quality of HRMSs were:
No emphasis in detailing
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More junior people are being assigned as HRMSs with
a lower experience level
Lack of measurable criteria for selection as in-
structors at HRMS school
Less warfare specialists are being assigned as HRMSs
with a subsequent loss of credibility
Lack of a career enhancing atmosphere in HRM
Some of the comments elicited by this question follow:
"Greatest amounts of progress we've made since I've
been in the program. I think that now we're
assigning, both officer and enlisted, professional
people who have academic credentials and an honest
interest in performing this as a readiness mission."
"It varies pretty widely .. .we 're getting a pretty
good shake of people."
"Good, but less talented than we've had in the past...
general decline in quality."
"Absolutely terrible. There's just no other way to
describe it. People who are assigned to us are
required to be in the top 50%.... and that's no
where near the caliber of people we need."
As a participant observer, the general concensus among
the HRMSs concerning this perception could not be assertain-
ed. However, some felt that the quality of the HRMS had
improved, while others thought that it was at least being
maintained.
Bishop and Gaskin's (1979) report on the HRM system
mentioned the lack of career enhancement noted by unrestricted
line officers toward the HRM program and recommended a change
in qualifications criteria for HRMSs to improve their credi-




It should be noted that the responses to this question
could have drawn out biases for any number of self serving
reasons. However, the convergence with issues identified
by a previous report seems to support the credibility of at
least some of the respondent's comments.
An interesting, although highly subjective, analysis of
the comments by detachment or center, seemed to point to
common perceptions about the quality of HRMSs in approxi-
mately 50% of the cases, be it good, bad, or average. In
addition, the direction of response (positive or negative)
in most of those locations tended to be in the same direc-
tion as the response to question two concerning the percep-
tion of HRM in the fleet. In other words, it appeared, in
some cases at least, that when an interviewee viewed other's
perceptions of HRM as positive or negative, he/she viewed
the quality of HRMSs in like manner, and that these feelings
tended to be shared by the detachment or center.
The most obvious surmise about the above analysis is
that some detachments/centers are perceiving that they are
getting good people who increase the credibility of the
program in the fleet, while other detachments/centers are
getting only bad people, who hurt the fleet's perception
of the HRM program. In the hope that such a dynamic is
not at work, some other possibilities seem more viable.
The climate in the center or detachment might be a
factor in the interviewee's perceptions. That is, a good
28

command climate might cause the HRMS to feel more positive
about his/her abilities and be able to project that image
to the client commands, who might then perceive the program
in a more positive light.
Another possibility could assert that the dynamic of a
self-fulfilling prophecy is at work in some HRM commands.
If a HRMS believes that the fleet perceives the HRM program
or him/her in a negative manner, then the HRMS might begin
to believe it and fulfill that role.
Question seven: What programs or efforts should be included
in an HRM ef fort? •
Question eight: What kinds of programs or efforts should
not be part of the HRM system?
These questions were analysed together as the responses
tended to overlap.
Many respondents interpreted the above questions in a
specific intervention context rather than from a total pro-
gram approach to the HRM system. The majority of responses
therefore dealt with whatever effort was necessary to meet
the client command's needs.
Among those efforts cited as useful, if needed by the
client command were:
Equal opportunity and affirmative action planning
Drug/alcohol abuse workshops




Assessment work (via interviewing)
Crisis interventions
Women at sea workshops











Overseas duty support programs
The general concensus was best expressed by the following
statement:
"Anything that relates to making organizations more
effective that we can do, utilizing behavior
science, is relevant."
Although many interviewees responded "none" to question
eight, some respondents noted the following as areas that
HRM should attempt to stay away from:
Utilization in an investigators role (IG context)
Grievances




All forms of individual counseling in the areas of
alcohol/drug abuse and retention (utilize the HRMSs
and career counselors)
Comments from this question included:
"Anything not directed to what that command needs,
can afford, and what it's ready for."
"Those (programs) not coming from increased funding
or support. Dilutes what we're supposed to be
doing in the first place."
Two observations regarding these questions were high-
lighted by the author's field experience and confirmed by
the interview data. The first concerns the overseas duty
support program. This program was perceived by some to be
"dying a natural death," with virtually no requests from
fleet units for its services and little to no concern within
the HRM structure for its continuation.
The second issue involves the equal opportunity program.
While a couple of interviewees thought it should be made an
adjunct program, more responses tended toward modifying it
to make it more realistic. Some respondents wanted to
place renewed emphasis in actions to counter racism and
cited their observations of increased racist activities.
One interviewee thought that a phase III equal opportunity
program might be necessary.
Considering the role that the early equal opportunity
programs were reported to have played in the current nega-
tive perception profile of HRM, it appears that the problems
with the early equal opportunity programs were not a result
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of having an equal opportunity program, but were somehow
caused in its delivery.
Question nine: How will the coming voluntary HRM cycle
affect the Navy's HRM effort?
This question elicited the most evenly distributed across
the board responses of any of the questions asked. An
analysis by location hinted at a similarity of responses.
An analysis by individual and area with question two (fleet
perceptions of HRM) failed to turn up any discernable pat-
terns of responses. The hypothesis behind such an analysis
was that if HRM was thought to be perceived badly in one's
area, then that individual might be concerned with a volun-
tary HRAV cycle. A possible explanation may lie in one
respondent's view that a voluntary cycle would lead to a
higher satisfaction level for the HRMS as he/she would be
working with organizations who would want to use the HRM
services.
Among those locations reporting that their operations
were already voluntary (approximately 30% of the locations)
,
the general feeling may have leaned more to the encourage-
ment of a voluntary cycle. However, such an observation
would be very tenuous at best.
Many who responded favorably to a move to a voluntary
cycle qualified their response with the need to market HRM
in their local areas. Others thought that such a move
could lead to a better "fit" in the client's schedule.
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The most frequently reported concern was that the good
organization would ask for help and get better while the
poorer units would not. The thought being that those units
who needed help would perceive themselves to be overly
burdened with their own crisis management of too many other
commitments. Others thought that it would appear to be a
backing off of top level commitment to the HRM program.
Some responses to question nine follow:
"Very positively here. . .will effect each HRMC & HRMD
differently depending on marketing skills."
"It is now. If done properly (advertising) - no
problem.
"
"Not sure. Based on past 6-8 month significant
increase in volunteer work (then) voluntary HRM is
the way to go .
"
"The expectation will be the command that won't
(participate) due to operational commitments."
"Very dumb to go to that. People who need it won't
get it because they're busy and it's (asking for
help) an ego buster."
Question ten: Is there anything else you'd like to add
concerning the past or future of HRM in
the Navy?
Most of the ending comments were upbeat and positive
about the importance and future of HRM in the Navy. Several
suggestions for improving the HRM program were elicited.
Some thought that HRMSs should be a voluntary position
and that back-to-back tours were necessary to increase the
HRMS ' s performance level. Others thought that the billet
of HRMS should not be voluntary and that three years was
33

the maximum amount of time one should spend as an HRMS
,
otherwise he/she loses touch with the Navy. Not surpris-
ingly, such comments normally mirrored the experience of
the HRMS making the comment.
Other concerns and recommendations follow:
A continuing need for commitment to the HRM program
from top level commands and commanders
An improved instruction for the utilization of the
independent duty HRMS
Increased funding for travel for HRM activities
Emphasis on equal opportunity
Integration with the LMET program
Increased marketing of HRM services
Some of the comments generated by this question follow:
"(HRM is) here to stay. There is a real need for
it given the high attrition rates."
"Most effective to have a HRM individual at the
command level. Human Resource Officer is now a
collateral duty. Should be more like a maintenance
3M manager ... full time job."
"More emphasis should be placed on it from ISICs
and type commanders. More emphasis on scheduling
of HRAV so that no other inspections interfere."
9
"I'm offended by the lack of emphasis in the Navy
in equal opportunity, especially the lack of
understanding of institutional racism. . .Personal
racism and sexism is on the rise. . .more advanced




The findings seem to imply that the HRM specialists' "as
is" perceptions of their program and their coworkers are not
always the same as their "should be" perceptions. There
was a leaning toward an improving image profile of HRM with
the fleet, however, several areas of the program appeared
to warrant change from the specialists' perspective.
The reported lack of knowledge about HRM at the staff
and ISIC level could have negative implications for the
HRM program. There may be a lack of importance attached to
the scheduling of HRM activities, as these command levels
play a large role in the scheduling of operational units.
In addition, a commanding officer of an operational unit
may not be motivated to participate fully in an HRM activity
if he/she perceives his/her superior to feel less than
positively inclined toward the HRM program.
The resistance to the HRM program reported in the middle
management is an additional concern since these individuals
are the operational leaders of tomorrow.
A possible inference from the data might suggest that a
voluntary HRM cycle could result in a lessening of the HRM
activities in the surface and subsurface communities due to
commitment levels and manning levels respectfully. In
addition there may be no medium for units to ascertain the
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advantages of the HRM program, although some schools are
presently disseminating information about HRM prior to
individual's sea duty tours.
Perceptions of HRM might vary by locale for any number
of reasons, i.e., type of community mix served, number of
clients, etc. If the fleets' perceptions of the HRM program
vary by locality, then a voluntary HRM effort may be less
successful in some areas than in others.
A further implication of the data might infer that if
the HRM specialist feels that a failure of HRM activities
is "closed doors" and a voluntary HRM cycle leads to an
increase of "closed doors" situations, then the HRM special-
ist may feel more negative about his/her self image, thus
reducing his/her effectiveness. However, another possible
supposition might ascertain that the HRM specialist's self
image may become more positive as his/her satisfaction level
increases with more responsive and willing clients.
An additional concern regarding the possibility of a
voluntary HRM cycle was the often stated outcome that good
units would ask for help (HRM services) and get better
while poorer units would not request assistance and sub-
sequently lose more of their organizational effectiveness.
Another implication might be the perception among commanding
officers that the HRM program no longer has the backing of
top level commands, thereby reducing its importance from
their point of view.
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In assessing the quality of HRM specialists, several
implications were manifested. While the quality of HRM
specialists appears to be improving, there still seems to
be a question of whether the assignment criteria for becoming
an HRM specialist is adequate given the skills he/she must
master. A possible result of assigning less than adequate
personnel to the HRM program would be to lower the image of
the HRM program with a subsequent loss of credibility.
The same dynamics may be at work in the assignment of
fewer warfare specialists to HRM billets, possibly causing
a loss of credibility in the perceptions of their client
commands. However, an equally disturbing implication might
involve the lowering of professional abilities of HRM
specialists due to a lack of return assignments to HRM
billets. These two situations, the assignment of more war-
fare specialists and HRM specialists with previous HRM
experience to HRM billets, aren't qualities that the same
individual normally possesses. This is due to the opera-
tional time lost in one's professional development as a
warfare specialist if one takes return assignments in HRM.
Of course, this perception is applicable only in what is
currently considered a normal career path.
A possible consequence of the death of the overseas
diplomacy program might be a lack of knowledge of foreign
cultures and mannerisms by the fleet sailors. This could
result in a perceived lack of respect for foreign customs
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and lead to a degradation of the American image overseas.
Regarding the concern expressed by HRM specialists about
the current state of equal opportunity in the Navy, one
might surmise that without a new equal opportunity program
the Navy could be setting the stage for some of the same
type of racial problems it faced in the past. This is an
especially grave point considering the recent unrest dis-
played in areas of the civilian sector. An equally important
consideration to having an equal opportunity program seems
to be the method of its delivery. A possible implication
in this regard, is that an equal opportunity program similar
to those of the past could drive more resistance and nega-
tivism to the HRM program in general.
Reduced funding for travel for HRM activities may be
perceived as a backing off of top level support. Many de-
tachments utilize travel funds in working with commands.
Without the funds, many commands would be alienated from
receiving HRM services.
CDR Frank L. Mixner ' s (1978) study addressed the attitude
of the U.S. Naval Officer toward HRM and specified areas
in which to work for improvement of this attitude. Utiliz-
ing an approach based on consistency theory of attitude
change, he developed a survey questionnaire and distributed
it to naval officer students at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The questionnaire asked for the degree that specific
adjectives described the HRM specialist and HRM program.
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He found that the adjectives describing the HRM special-
ist that needed the most improvement from the naval officers
'
viewpoint were: respected, practical, productive, competent,
and professional. In addition, he recommended that high
performers be assigned to HRM billets and that HRM special-
ists be promoted with their peers [Mixner, 1978].
The present study found that the quality of HRM specialists
seems to be improving. This was especially significant con-
sidering the number of comments generated that pointed to an
improvement in the quality of HRM specialists over a time
frame that was generally something less than two years.
However, perceptions of a lack of emphasis in detailing HRM
specialists and lack of a career enhancing atmosphere as a
HRM specialist are still present in the fleet.
The adjectives respected and professional may have been
a reflection on the lack of warfare specialists assigned as
a HRM specialist. This credibility gap seems to still be
present, at least to some degree.
The adjectives practical and productive could have been
a reflection on the difficulty in determining a successful
HRM activity, its lack of immediate results, its non-
quantifiable nature, and the lack of knowledge about HRM
programs, due to the absence of a marketing mechanism.
Mixner (1978) also found that adjectives describing the
HRM program that needed the most improvement were: effective,
successful, efficient, productive and practical. He
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recommended that people be informed of HRM program successes,
that the program be more responsive to fleet needs, and that
additional emphasis be placed on education at the required
HRM courses.
The present study found that there is still a problem in
informing fleet members of HRM successes. This is due, in
part, to the problem of determining a successful HRM venture
and the absence of a fleet wide marketing mechanism. In
addition, the confidentiality of the HRM data doesn't allow
for dissemination of successful interventions. The psyche
of some commanding officers may also prevent them from
admitting that HRM had helped them.
There was a tendency among the interviewees to state that
progress had been made in becoming more responsive to fleet
needs and credit for improving perceptions of the HRM program
was given to the required HRM courses at PCO/PXO school and
the Naval Postgraduate School's HRM curriculum.
An interesting observation in analyzing Mixner ' s (1978)
findings with the current study involved Mixner ' s partici-
pants. The student population at the Naval Postgraduate
School is largely composed of middle management personnel.
This population was determined to be the most resistant to
the HRM program by the present study. A possible implication
of this finding is that any possible recommendations for





Specific recommendations include the following:
1. Arrange for HRM interventions with staff and ISIC
level commands or at least provide some form of
presentation workshop to familiarize these levels
with HRM activities.
2. Initiate a participative approach to the advent of a
voluntary HRM cycle, whereby HRM centers and de-
tachments are allowed to implement the move on a
time table either determined by them or in some
joint fashion with higher commands.
3. Initiate a major marketing effort of HRM activities
supported and disseminated from the highest echelons
of the Navy utilizing commanding officers' testimon-
ials of successful HRM efforts (when authorized by
those commanding officers)
.
4. Increase the education of the middle management
level of the Navy in HRM theory and practices.
5. Ascertain more restrictive criteria for assignment
for duty as an HRM specialist.
6. Provide an HRM specialist assignment policy of some
mix of warfare specialists along with a specialized
cadre of HRM specialist professionals with more than
one tour in HRM.
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7. Introduce a promotion policy to insure that the
deserving HRM specialist professional is advanced in
rank with his/her peer group.
8. Place a renewed emphasis in the overseas duty support
program. This might be best accomplished in unison
with a mandated HRM visit prior to deployments for
the purpose of introducing management techniques that
may be of interest to commanding officers planning
a deployment to increase their overseas operations.
9. The consideration of a new action to counter racism
program, paying special attention to its phraseology,
approach, and delivery.
10. Separate HRM travel funds from other travel funds when
cuts in funding are made. This is necessary due to
the importance of assisting all fleet units in in-
creasing their effectiveness as organizations.
While the HRM program has made improvements in its image,
there still seem to be many areas of concern that warrant
attention.
This study has shown the qualitative interviewing technique
to be helpful, not only in identifying perceptions, but in
providing supporting and explanatory comments concerning
those perceptions as well. When coupled with other data
gathering methods, as in triangulation, the data becomes a





Preliminary data: Who /Rank
Where
Time/Date
I'm Lieutenant Gus Lorberg. I'm a student in the Human
Resource Management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate
School in Monterey, California. I'm conducting telephone
interviews concerning the Human Resource Management Program
in the Navy as part of my thesis research. I'd like to talk
to you for about fifteen minutes if this is a convenient time
for you.
My thesis is about the Navy's Human Resource Management
Program, and how it is understood in the fleet. I also hope
to make recommendations that will affect the future of the
Navy ' s program
.
I want to assure you that whatever you say is strictly
confidential. I'm not interested in identifying you person-
ally. Nor am I going to quote you personally. I will sum-
marize the opinions I get when I have completed interviewing.
Do you have any questions about the nature of our talks? Do
you have any objections to the tape recording of this inter-
view for purposes of analysis?
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1. What is your experience with the Navy's HRM program?
2. How do you feel HRM is perceived in the fleet?
3. Why do you think these perceptions are so?
4. Are fleet personnel aware of HRM program successes?
5. What would a success or failure of the HRM Cycle be in
your opinion?
6. What quality of people are being assigned to the HRM
effort? What quality were assigned in the past?
7. What programs or efforts should be included in an HRM
effort?
8. What kinds of programs or efforts should not be a part
of the HRM system?
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9. How will the coming voluntary HRM cycle affect the Navy's
HRM effort?
10. Is there anything else you'd like to add concerning the
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